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Abstract
Measures of preferences are primarily useful in that they are helpful in predicting
behavior. We perform an experiment which demonstrates that the timing of the measure-
ment of social preferences can a¤ect such a measure. Researchers often measure social
preferences by posing a series of dictator game allocation decisions; we use a particular
technique, Social Value Orientation (SVO). We vary the order of the SVO measurement
and a lager stakes dictator game. In our rst study, we nd that subjects with prosocial
preferences act even more prosocially when the SVO measurement is administered rst,
whereas those with selsh preferences are una¤ected by the order. In our second study we
vary the order of the SVO measurement and a nonstandard dictator game. We do not nd
the e¤ect found in the rst study. This suggests that the e¤ect found in the rst study is
driven by choices involving the size of surplus.
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1 Introduction
Ideally, an experimenter measures the preferences of a subject in order to make predictions
regarding behavior. This behavior is commonly conceptualized as a function which depends
exclusively on a stable set of preferences. Similarly, the measurement of preferences is com-
monly assumed to be a function which depends exclusively of these preferences. If these two
assumptions hold then the relationship between a measure of preferences and behavior should
not depend on the timing of the measurement. In this paper, we present evidence which
challenges this view.
It has been known for some time that many subjects do not simply maximize their own
material payo¤s.1 Specically, it is often observed that some subjects will sacrice their own
material payo¤s so that other subjects will receive a better material outcome. Researchers
often attempt to infer the nature of these social preferences by posing a series of allocation
decisions, often referred to as dictator games. These decisions entail a choice of an allocation of
hypothetical or small material outcomes distributed between the subject and another subject.
A specic measurement technique, which we use here, is Social Value Orientation (SVO).
In our experiment we vary the order of the measurement of SVO and a standard, lager
stakes dictator game.2 While we nd that the measure of SVO is signicantly related to
behavior in the dictator game, we also nd that the mapping between the measurement of SVO
and behavior in the dictator game is related to the timing of the measurement. Specically, we
nd that the subjects, for whom SVO indicates prosocial preferences, act even more prosocially
in the larger stakes dictator game when the SVO measurement is administered rst. By
contrast, we nd that the subjects for whom SVO suggests selsh preferences are una¤ected
by the order of the measurement.
To help identify possible causes of the above result, we run another study identical to the
rst, with the exception that the dictator game is such that the relative price of each allocation
is 1 to 3, rather than the standard 1 to 1. In other words, each $0.50 kept by the subject
reduces the recipients payo¤s by $1.50. In this case, we nd no signicant di¤erence between
the prosocials who have SVO measured before the dictator game and the prosocials who have
1For an early example, see Deutsch (1958).
2For more on dictator games, see Forsythe et. al. (1994), Ho¤man et. al. (1994), Eckel and Grossman
(1996), Ru­ e (1998) and Bolton et. al. (1998).
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SVO measured after the dictator game. This suggests that decisions involving the creation of
surplus in the measurement of SVO are important to the endogeneity found in the prosocials
in the rst study.
1.1 Social Value Orientation as a Measure of Social Preferences
We measure social preferences through SVO because the measure is relatively easy to admin-
ister and interpret. The specic technique which we use, adapted from Van Lange et. al.
(1997), consists of 9 items with three possible choices involving material payo¤s accruing to
the subject and another subject.3 Each of the nine items has an individualistic response,
a prosocial response and a competitive response. The individualistic response is the one in
which the material payo¤s accruing to oneself are the largest. In other words, selecting the
individualistic choice suggests that the subject neither positively nor negatively values ma-
terial payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The prosocial response is the one in which the
sum of the material payo¤s accruing to both the subject and the other subject are the largest.
In other words, selecting the prosocial response suggests that the subject positively values
the material payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The competitive response is the one in
which the di¤erence between the material payo¤s accruing to the subject and the other sub-
ject are the largest. In other words, selecting the competitive choice suggests that the subject
negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
Translated into a utility function, SVO measures the form of u(xown; xother) where xown
is the material payo¤ accruing to self and xother is the material payo¤ accruing to another
person. A prosocial choice indicates that @u@xother > 0, an individualistic choice suggests that
@u
@xother
= 0 and a competitive choice suggests that @u@xother < 0.
Further, there is much written on the stability of SVO. For instance, Bogaert et. al. (2008)
suggest that over the 40 years since its introduction by Messick and McClintock (1968), it has
been widely regarded as providing a stable measure of a personality trait. However, recent
work has suggested instances where SVO can be a¤ected by the setting and is thereby a
less than perfectly stable measure. Iedema and Poppe (1994) show that the measurement of
SVO can be a¤ected by self-presentation e¤ects. Smeesters et. al. (2003) show that priming
3See the appendix for a complete description of the SVO items which we use.
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certain types of behavior can lead to a di¤erent mapping from SVO to behavior.4 While
SVO is considered relatively stable, to our knowledge there is no work suggesting that the
relationship between the measurement of SVO and behavior can be a¤ected by the order of
the measurement.
It is obviously problematic that the timing of the measurement of preferences might a¤ect
the relationship between the measure and behavior related to the measure. A measure is
primarily useful to the extent that it can form a basis for making predictions about behavior.5
When behavior and the measure of preferences are functions not exclusively of preferences
then the usefulness of the measure is somewhat degraded.
SVO also appears in the economics literature.6 However each of these papers uses the
ring measure (Griesinger and Livingston, 1973), which is slightly di¤erent than the technique
which we use. The ring measure consists of 24 pair-wise items rather than 9 items with 3
responses.7 However, similar to the technique which we employ, the ultimate objective is
to classify subjects as one of a few types. Relatively little is known about the relationship
between the ring measure and the measure which we employ (Bogaert et. al., 2008). However,
we opt for the latter as it requires fewer responses and, in our opinion, is more transparent.
As a result of these characteristics, we conjecture that the e¤ects which we nd here would
only be strengthened by using the ring measure.
Finally, measuring social preferences via dictator games, like SVO, has the advantage that
it only considers a situation where strategic issues are absent. Although all decisions would
be made in the absence of the feedback of the actions of other dictators, it still remains
possible that the subject would anticipate some reciprocal arrangement. Therefore, similar
to Carpenter (2005), we employ a triadic design whereby each dictator decides an allocation
involving self and another dictator. This other dictator does not decide on an allocation
involving the original dictator but rather on a third dictator.
4Also see Au and Kwong (2004) and Hertel and Fiedler (1994,1998).
5SVO has been used to study behavior in games (Parks, 1994; Kramer et. al., 1986; Pruyn and Riezehos,
2001), the decision to use public transportation (Van Vugt et. al., 1996), proenvironmental behavior (Cameron
et. al., 1998; Joireman et. al., 2001) and volunteerism (McClintock and Allison, 1989).
6See Buckley et. al. (2001), Buckley et. al. (2003), Burlando and Guala (2005), Carpenter (2003),
Carpenter (2005), Cornelissen et. al. (2007), Kanagaretnam et. al. (2009) and O¤erman et. al. (1996).
7Sonnemans et. al. (2006) uses a visual representation of the ring whereby the subject selects their location
on the ring with a single click rather than responding to 24 items.
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1.2 Other Measures of Social Preferences
Another commonly used social preference measurement technique was developed by Andreoni
and Miller (2002). SVO is similar to this technique in that both techniques pose a series of
dictator games however there remain important di¤erences. In Andreoni and Miller, choice is
much less restricted than in SVO. Each SVO item has only three possible responses, whereas
in Andreoni and Miller each item seeks an allocation of tokens ranging from 40 to 100. As
a result, Andreoni and Miller yields less coarse data than does SVO. However, the choice in
Andreoni and Miller is less transparent than SVO, as the latter explicitly lists the material
allocation of each choice. We are not aware of a study which compares the relative merits of
SVO and that proposed by Andreoni and Miller.
Charness and Rabin (2002) pose a series of simple games to learn the specic form of social
preferences8 related to relative wealth and reciprocity. The nature of the social preferences
might depend on whether others payo¤s are higher than or lower than the subjects own
payo¤s, therefore Charness and Rabin vary this aspect of their items. By contrast, in SVO
the subject decides among choices where monetary payo¤s accruing to self are never less than
that accruing to the other subject. Also, in contrast the technique employed in Charness and
Rabin, SVO is not equipped to evaluate preferences for reciprocity.
1.3 Endogenous Social Preferences and Behavioral Spillovers
Consider the relationship between our paper and research on endogenous social preferences.
For instance, Carpenter (2005) and Canegallo et. al. (2008) investigate how the strategic
environment can a¤ect preferences.9 Also, Guth et. al. (2008) nds that subjects who con-
tribute more in a public goods game are signicantly more trusting in a subsequent investment
game. By contrast, we study whether the relationship between behavior and measurement of
preferences is a¤ected by the timing of the measure.
There also exists a strand of literature which examines the role of the environment on play
in games. For instance, Bednar et. al. (2009) describe an experiment in which subjects simul-
8Chen and Li (2009) perform a similar type of analysis when considering the type, or identity, of the other
subject.
9Schotter et. al. (1996) examines the e¤ect of framing on judgements of fairness and is therefore related
to endogenous preferences. Eckel and Grossman (2005) nd that a strong identity manipulation can induce
more cooperation in public goods game. Also, see Bowles (1998) and Poulsen and Poulsen (2006) for more on
endogenous preferences.
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taneously play two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. The authors nd that behavior
in a particular game is a¤ected by corresponding paired game.10 This literature contends that
strategies which are used in one game are often applied to the other, despite that the games
should be played independently. The authors examine these behavior spillovers but, unlike
the present paper, they do not measure preferences.
2 Study 1
2.1 Overview
We seek to better understand whether the timing of a measurement of social preferences mat-
ters to the relationship between the measurement and behavior related to the measurement.
Therefore, we vary the order of the measurement of social preferences and play in the dictator
game.
2.2 Procedure
A total of 96 students enrolled in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United
States participated. Study 1 was conducted in 5 classes of 16, 21, 39, 12 and 8 subjects. The
responses were entered on paper The subjects were given course credit for attendance and were
told that that a randomly selected 25% from each session would be paid the amount earned
in the experiment. The subjects completed a measure of SVO and decided on an allocation
in a standard $10 dictator game.
The subjects were aware of the triadic design as they were told to make allocation decisions
involving themselves ("You") and another subject ("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2")
was to make allocations involving Other2 and You. Therefore, the amount accruing to each
subject was what was kept in the You-Other1 allocation decisions plus what Other2 did not
keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. In both the measurement of SVO and the choice
in the dictator game, the status of You, Other1 and Other2 remained xed. This description
of the triadic design was provided verbally by the same male experimenter and in written
form given to each subject. The exact form of the written instructions are provided in the
appendix.
10Also see Bednar and Page (2007), Crawford and Broseta (1998) and Van Hyuck et. al. (1993).
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The measurement of SVO entailed the exact nine items from Van Lange et. al. (1997).
The subjects were presented with three items on each of three pages. In Van Lange et. al., the
subjects decide on an allocation of points which carry no nancial implications. By contrast, in
our experiment subjects are o¤ered a conversion rate of points to money, whereby the subject
is e¤ectively deciding on an allocation of a very small amount of money. Across all 9 SVO
items, the subject could keep as little as $0.94 and as much as $1.06. Also across the SVO
items, the subject could send as little as $0.19 and send as much as $0.94. The subjects were
not told these amounts, however they could be calculated with relative ease. The exact items
and the conversion from points to money in the SVO measure is given in the appendix. The
dictator game was presented to the subjects in $0.25 increments. The subjects were directed
to indicate which of the 41 dictator game allocations they most preferred. The exact form
of the dictator game is provided in the appendix in order to illustrate that it is unlikely that
there was any confusion about the allocation in the dictator game.
Within each of the 5 classes, approximately half of the subjects answered the SVO items
then made a choice in the dictator game. We refer to this treatment as SVO First. Approxi-
mately half of each class responded to the dictator game then answered the SVO items. We
refer to this treatment as SVO Last. Note that there is no feedback in this experiment. Each
subject completes the experiment without knowing what the other subjects have selected.
2.3 Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects, which is the sum of the amount kept in the
SVO measurement and the amount kept in the dictator game, ranged from $0.94 to $11.06,
with an average of $7.09. The total amount accruing to the subjects, which is the sum of what
was kept by the subject and what was sent by Other2, ranged from $2.51 to $21.93, with an
average of $11.69.
Using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997), we categorized 32 subjects (33%) as
prosocials, 39 subjects (41%) as individualists and 5 subjects (5%) as competitors. There
were 20 subjects (21%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6
choices of a particular type. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to
SVO categorization and timing of measurement.
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Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 14 24 3 8 49
SVO Last 18 15 2 12 47
Total 32 39 5 20 96
Table 1: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and measurement timing
See Figure 1 for the distribution of amounts kept in the dictator game by SVO Last or
SVO First treatments.11 The gure is arranged by the rst digit of the amount kept in the
dictator game.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Amount Kept in Dictator Game
SVO First
SVO Last
Figure 1: Distribution of amount kept in dictator game by SVO First and SVO Last
treatment.
The measure of SVO was found to provide a signicant predictor of behavior across both
treatments. The prosocial subjects (M = 4:68; SD = 1:60) kept signicantly less than did
the proself (individualists and competitors) subjects (M = 7:28; SD = 2:48), t(74) = 5:19;
p < 0:01.12 While unclassied subjects (M = 5:75; SD = 3:19) kept less than proself subjects,
t(62) = 2:09; p = 0:020 and prosocial subjects kept less than unclassied subjects, t(50) = 1:61;
p = 0:057.
11See Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Cox and Sadiraj (2006) for other papers with dictator game choices in
which some subjects kept less than 50%.
12 In this paper, all given p-values are for one tail tests.
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Additional evidence that SVO su¢ ciently predicts behavior comes from the relationship
between the consistency of the SVO responses and choice in the dictator game. A measure
equaling 9 indicates perfect consistency in the set of responses and a measure between 6 and
8 indicates a less than perfectly consistent set of responses. See Table 2 for the amount kept
in the dictator game by SVO classication and consistency of measurement.
Prosocial Individualistic
Measure=9 4:31 7:95
(1:69) (2:12)
Measure<9 5:78 6:12
(0:53) (2:11)
Table 2: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and consistency of
measurement with standard deviation in parentheses
Among those classied as prosocial, those with a measure equal to 9 (24 subjects) kept a
signicantly smaller share than those with a measure between 6 and 8, t(30) = 2:41; p = 0:01.
Also, among those classied as individualistic, those with a measure equal to 9 (26 subjects)
kept a signicantly larger share than those with a measure between 6 and 8, t(37) = 2:55;
p < 0:001. Therefore, we are reasonably condent of the relationship between the SVO
measure and behavior in the dictator game.
As our primary objective is to learn whether the mapping from the measure of SVO
to behavior depends on the order of the measurement, we now compare dictator allocations
given the treatment. First, the di¤erence between the amount kept in the SVO First treatment
(M = $6:04; SD = 2:89) and in the SVO Last treatment (M = $6:16; SD = 2:40) is not
signicant, t(94) = 0:23; p = 0:41. However, a signicant relationship emerges when one looks
within SVO classications. See Figure 2 and Table 3 for the amount kept in the dictator game
by SVO classication and treatment.
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Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First 4:14 7:38
(2:28) (2:23)
SVO Last 5:10 7:28
(0:54) (2:40)
Table 3 Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and treatment with
standard deviation in parentheses
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
ProSocial Individualistic
A
m
ou
nt
 K
ep
t i
n 
D
ic
ta
to
r G
am
e
SVO Last
SVO First
Figure 2: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and treatment
Although the individualists in the SVO First treatment do not keep a signicantly di¤erent
amount than the individualists in the SVO Last treatment, there is a signicant di¤erence
within the prosocial subjects. Prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment keep less than
the prosocials in the SVO Last treatment, t(30) = 1:72; p = 0:048.
This relationship becomes even more signicant when one restricts attention to those with
a consistent SVO measure. The prosocials who had an SVO score of 9 in the SVO Last
treatment (M = 4:89; SD = 0:30) kept signicantly more than the prosocials who had an
SVO score of 9 in the SVO First Treatment (M = 3:64; SD = 2:34), t(22) = 1:92; p = 0:034.
It appears that those with individualistic preferences are not inuenced by their actions
in the measurement of SVO, however those with prosocial preferences are a¤ected by their
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choice.
3 Study 2
3.1 Overview
Roughly speaking, Study 1 nds that prosocial subjects act even more prosocially when the
SVO measurement is administered rst, whereas selsh subjects are una¤ected by the order
of the measurement. Based on the data available from Study1, it is not clear to us what
drives this result. As there is no choice involving the creation of surplus in the standard
dictator game, it is possible that the creation of surplus by the prosocial subjects in the SVO
First treatment predisposes them to be more generous in the dictator game than comparable
prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. Therefore, if the dictator game was designed in a
manner in which choice decided the amount of surplus then the results in the SVO Last
treatment might converge to that of the SVO First treatment. However, it is also possible
that with the standard dictator game, being selsh is too easy and so the individualists are
not a¤ected by the timing. Therefore, if the dictator game is designed in a manner in which
being selsh is more costly then we expect a divergence of the results of the SVO First and
Last treatments of the individualists. In Study 2, we hope to to shed some light on the relative
merit of these two explanations.
Study 2 follows the same procedure as Study 1 with the exception that, rather than using
a standard dictator game, we use a dictator game in which the relative allocation price is 1
to 3. In other words, the most selsh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the most
generous allocation is $0 to self and $30 to other. This nonstandard dictator game has the
advantages that the amount of total surplus is a matter of choice and being selsh is relatively
more costly. If we nd that the timing has a reduced inuence on the prosocials then we favor
the former explanation. If we nd that individualists are now a¤ected by the timing then we
will favor the latter explanation.
3.2 Procedure
A total of 90 students in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United States
participated. Study 2 was conducted in 4 classes of 21, 42, 16 and 11 subjects. The procedures
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in Study 2 are identical to that in Study 1 with the exception of the form of the dictator game.
Rather than the standard dictator game in which the trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other
payo¤s is 1 to 1, the dictator game used in Study 2 has a trade-o¤ of 1 to 3. In other words,
to increase the amount kept by $0.50, the subjects must reduce the amount sent to the other
subject by $1.50. The subjects own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and the other
subjects payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which
of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred. The exact form of the dictator game
is provided in the appendix.
3.3 Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects ranged from $0.94 to $11.06, with an average
of $8.17. The total amount accruing to the subjects ranged from $1.13 to $42.00, with an
average of $17.36.
Again using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997), we categorized 44 subjects (49%)
as prosocials, 34 subjects (38%) as individualists and 4 subjects (4%) as competitors. There
were 8 subjects (9%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices
of a particular type. Table 4 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to SVO
categorization and timing of measurement.
Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 21 16 2 5 44
SVO Last 23 18 2 3 46
Total 44 34 4 8 90
Table 4: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and measurement timing
See Figure 3 for the distribution of amounts kept in the dictator game by SVO Last or
SVO First treatments. The gure is arranged by the rst digit of the amount kept in the
dictator game.
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Figure 3: Distribution of subjects and amount kept in dictator game by SVO First or SVO
Last treatments.
Similar to Study 1, we nd that the SVO measure predicts behavior across both treatments.
The prosocial subjects (M = 6:44; SD = 2:79) kept signicantly less than did the proself
(individualists and competitors) subjects (M = 8:28; SD = 2:33), t(76) = 2:86; p < 0:01. As
in Study 1, we nd that the consistency of the response is related to the choice in the dictator
game. See Table 5 to see the amount kept across both treatments by the consistency of the
measurement.
Prosocial Individualistic
Measure=9 5:97 8:38
(3:11) (2:37)
Measure<9 7:46 7:94
(1:57) (2:53)
Table 5: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and consistency of
measurement with standard deviation in parentheses
Among those classied as prosocial, subjects with a measure equal to 9 (30 subjects) kept
a signicantly smaller share than subjects with a measure between 6 and 8, t(42) = 1:70;
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p = 0:049. However in contrast to Study 1, among those classied as individualistic, subjects
with a measure equal to 9 (17 subjects) did not keep a signicantly di¤erent amount than
subjects with a measure between 6 and 8, t(32) = 0:52; p = 0:30.
Finally, we may ask whether the timing matters for dictator game in Study 2. See Table
6 for the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First 5:98 8:00
(3:18) (2:54)
SVO Last 6:87 8:31
(2:36) (2:38)
Table 6: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and treatment with
standard deviation in parentheses
Although the prosocials in the SVO First treatment keep less than the prosocials in the
SVO Last treatment, this di¤erence is not signicant, t(42) = 1:06; p = 0:147. However, as
in Study 1, there is no signicant di¤erence in the amount kept by individualists in the SVO
First and SVO Last treatments, t(32) = 0:361; p = 0:360.
The timing remains insignicant among the prosocials even when attention is restricted
to subjects with perfectly consistent SVO measures. The prosocials who had an SVO score
of 9 in the SVO Last treatment (M = 6:4333; SD = 2:78) kept more than the prosocials who
had an SVO score of 9 in the SVO First Treatment (M = 5:50; SD = 3:43), however this
relationship is insignicant, t(28) = 0:82; p = 0:21.
4 Discussion
The main result in Study 1 provided evidence that the relationship between behavior and the
measurement of social preferences can depend on the order of the measurement. Specically,
we found that prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment keep signicantly less in the
standard dictator game than prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. In Study 2, we found
that there is no signicant di¤erence between the SVO First and SVO Last treatments for
either prosocials or individualists. From this we infer that the results in Study 1 are driven
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by the presence of choices involving the creation of surplus. The choice of the size of surplus
is present in both stages of Study 2 but only one stage in Study 1.
5 Concluding Comments
In this paper, we describe two studies in which we measure social preferences through Social
Value Orientation (SVO) and observe behavior in a dictator game. In Study 1, we vary the
order of the SVO measurement and a standard dictator game. We nd evidence that subjects
with prosocial preferences act more prosocially when the SVO measurement is taken rst. On
the other hand, our evidence suggests that subjects with individualistic preferences are not
a¤ected by the order of the measurement. This result calls into question the assumption that
behavior and the measure of preferences are functions exclusively of a underlying set of stable
preferences.
An explanation for the main result in Study 1 is not obvious. To gain some insight on
the matter, Study 2 performs the identical procedure as in Study 1 with the exception that
the dictator game exhibits a 1 to 3 trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other payo¤s, whereas
the standard dictator game has a 1 to 1 trade-o¤. We nd no signicant di¤erence between
those making dictator game decisions before SVO and those making dictator game decisions
after SVO, for prosocials or individualists. Study 2 suggests that the main result of Study 1 is
driven by the presence of decisions regarding the size of the surplus. This creation of surplus,
which seems to only inuence the prosocials, is absent in the standard dictator game.
It is worth reecting on the limitations of the present experimental design. For instance,
we cannot determine whether the SVO measurement a¤ects the dictator game choices, the
dictator game choices a¤ects the SVO measurement or perhaps both. Such questions of
endogeneity are notoriously tricky and would require further study. Also, we are unable to
determine whether the relationship between behavior and the measure of social preferences is
fundamentally less malleable than the relationship for prosocials or whether this is a result
of the experimental design. For instance, the optimal choice of many individualists involves
a corner solution at the most selsh allocation. In this case, it is possible that we would be
unable to detect the inuence of the timing of the measurement for these selsh subjects,
whereas if their choice was interior their relationship would be found to be as the prosocials.
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It is also unclear if the timing matters in the measurement of preferences via Andreoni and
Miller, Charness-Rabin, or Chen-Li techniques. Finally, SVO only measures social preferences
when the subject receives a larger share than the other subject. The signicance of this detail
is not clear. Hopefully, future work will shed light on these issues.
What are we to make of the results? Perhaps most importantly, the above results suggest
that measuring social preferences before observing behavior might induce greater heterogeneity
in the behavior. Specically, it seems as if selsh people are una¤ected by the measurement
but prosocial subjects act more prosocially. Therefore, we do urge some caution in the timing
of the measurement of social preferences before observing behavior.
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6 Appendix
We asked the following 9 items (from Van Lange et. al., 1997) in order to measure the SVO
of the subjects. Each of the 9 items has a competitive answer, a individualistic answer and a
competitive answer. Each item is stated in terms of points where 100 points corresponded to
$0.02103.
Question 1 A B C
You: 480 points 540 points 480 points
Other1: 80 points 280 points 480 points
Question 2 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 100 points
Question 3 A B C
You: 520 points 520 points 580 points
Other1: 520 points 120 points 320 points
Question 4 A B C
You: 500 points 560 points 490 points
Other1: 100 points 300 points 490 points
Question 5 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 490 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 90 points
Question 6 A B C
You: 500 points 500 points 570 points
Other1: 500 points 100 points 300 points
Question 7 A B C
You: 510 points 560 points 510 points
Other1: 510 points 300 points 110 points
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Question 8 A B C
You: 550 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 100 points 500 points
Question 9 A B C
You: 480 points 490 points 540 points
Other1: 100 points 490 points 300 points
The individualistic answers are: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8A and 9C. The prosocial
answers are: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8C and 9B. The competitive answers are: 1A, 2C,
3B, 4A, 5C, 6B, 7C, 8B and 9A. Van Lange et. al. classies a subject according to the above
labels if six or more items are answered according to the above.
18
Instructions given to each subject:
19
Study 1 Dictator Game:
20
Study 2 Dictator Game:
21
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